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Obviously, we are talking about a negative subjection, the most 
obvious indication that flows of knowledge, action, and mobility, 
although continually solicited, lead only to repressive and regressive 
subjectivation1 
 
The tendencies in favour of general equality most decisively reject 
money, even though it is by nature a basically democratic levelling 




In this article I want to explore how the figure of debt might illuminate the 
racial politics of welfare in neoliberal Britain. I begin by giving a reading of the 
simultaneous unfolding of postwar race politics and the Beveridgean welfare 
state, and then turn to speculate on the interpellative appeal of neoliberal debt 
to minoritized subjects who have in certain respects been de facto excluded 
                                            
1 Maurizio Lazzarato, Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of 
Subjectivity, Los Angeles, Semiotexte, 2014, p10. 
2 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (third edition), London, Routledge, 
2004, p447. 
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from a prevailing regime of welfare citizenship. In particular, this article 
considers the ways in which household debt might, even as it increases social 
inequality, simultaneously produce ideas about equality and futurity, as well 
as gesture towards the possibility of post-national forms of identity and 
belonging. If we are to challenge the lowest-common-denominator logics of 
‘capitalist realism’ it is necessary to develop orientations to the economic that 
are as convincing as the popular stories that circulate about the operations of 
the neoliberal marketplace, and which are as meaningful as the social 
relations they play a part in constituting. Rather than reproduce the racialized 
model of welfare citizenship that is implicit to the ‘defence’ of the postwar 
welfare state, I suggest that there are elements of neoliberal market relations 
that might themselves serve as a more substantial basis for expressions of 
racial equality. There are, in other words, things that we could learn from 
neoliberal debt regimes in order to develop a more egalitarian future-oriented 
politics of social welfare and economic redistribution.  
 
Race and postwar welfare citizenship 
As austerity exerts itself as a political device upon the institutions of the British 
welfare state, the immediate post war conjuncture feels simultaneously 
resonant and far away. Even as the aesthetics of austerity culture become a 
central reference point in British cultural life,3 the founding of the welfare state 
is distantiated as an historical event, set in the middle of a broad-brush 
twentieth century as-seen-from the second decade of the twenty-first. It is this 
                                            
3 Rebecca Bramall, The Cultural Politics of Austerity: past and present in 
austere times, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
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combination of proximity and distance that facilitates recognition of the 
simultaneity of the welfare state and the phenomenon of postwar immigration, 
and encourages reflection on the relationship between the politics of welfare 
and the politics of race. 
 
The summer of 1948 has a particular resonance in British popular memory. 
On June 22 some 500 or so Jamaican migrants disembarked from the Empire 
Windrush at London’s Tilbury Docks, symbolic of the first wave of postcolonial 
immigration and the retrenchment of Britain’s empire. Within a fortnight, July 5 
saw the inauguration of Britain’s National Health Service (NHS), cornerstone 
of its postwar welfare state. Yet these events, and the significant shifts in 
British history they played a part in bringing about, are rarely thought together. 
It is not simply a temporal coincidence that 1948 saw the arrivals of both 
Empire Windrush and the NHS. Both were characterized by new compacts in 
citizen-state relations. Taking their lead from the Beveridge report of 1942, the 
architects of the welfare state advanced a notion of citizenship as universal 
entitlement. At the same time British colonial subjects (already de jure British 
citizens) were simultaneously given the right under the British Nationality Act 
of 1948 to travel to and work in the UK, and thus to become part of the new 
material-symbolic nexus of welfare citizenship. While 1948 can be 
retrospectively conceived as a moment of considerable social and cultural 
transformation in the character and complexion of British citizenship, it would 
be incorrect to think about the racial and welfare transformations of the 
postwar moment as elements of a single coherent plan or programme on the 
part of Clement Attlee’s presiding Labour government, or as indicating a 
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widespread cultural consensus about the relationship between the two. 
Despite the longstanding strand in anti-racist rhetoric that foregrounds the role 
of commonwealth immigrants in servicing welfare Britain (particularly in 
staffing the NHS), there is no easy connection between these phenomena. 
Indeed, it is often the case that race and welfare are placed in conflict with 
one another. As John Clarke has noted, accounts of welfare state 
universalism ‘repress evidence of a whole variety of exclusions and 
subordinations’,4 not least of which are the implicit conditions placed on 
welfare citizenship by an overdetermining nationalism. Though there is no real 
evidence for ‘welfare magnet arguments’,5 the welfare state is commonly 
evoked in immigration debate as a signifier of that which migrants covet and 
place under threat. Such rhetoric has a long history: as early as 1958, for 
example, the Tory peer the Marquess of Sailsbury (and later Chairman of the 
anti-decolonization pressure group the Monday Club) was worrying aloud 
from his seat in the House of Lords that an open door to Commonwealth 
immigration would cause the imminent breakdown of ‘the Welfare State, of 
which we are so proud’.6 Notwithstanding a long sequence of immigration 
restrictions put in place from 1962 onwards, populist complaints have 
                                            
4 John Clarke, Changing Welfare, Changing States: new directions in social 
policy, London, Sage, 2004, p14. 
5 Trude Sundberg,  ‘Attitudes to the Welfare State: A Systematic Review 
Approach to the Example of Ethnically Diverse Welfare States’, Sociological 
Research Online, 19, 1, (2014), §5.6. Available at: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/19/1/28.html [21.10.14]. 
6 Hansard, HL Deb, vol 212, 19 November (1958), §670. Available at:  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1958/nov/19/colour-prejudice-and-
violence#S5LV0212P0_19581119_HOL_54 [02.10.15]. 
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increasingly insisted that migrants intend to ‘exploit our lavish welfare state’7. 
When this lavishness is evidently in question, governments of both left and 
right have pandered to racist complaints of immigrant and refugee advantage-
taking, council house queue-jumping and benefit benefiting, and in doing so 
have found ‘a convenient scapegoat for a creaking welfare state’.8 
Longstanding racialized tensions around welfare and immigration are 
registered in contemporary accounts of ‘welfare chauvinism’ which reckon that 
immigrants have been accorded the status of ‘the new undeserving poor’.9 
 
While it is possible to make an argument that these racialized exclusions have 
frequently derived from the cynical calculations of populist political actors, 
there’s the prospect here of profounder processes at work in articulations of 
welfare citizenship. In so far as citizenship is never a question only of formal, 
abstract or legal entitlement but always involves normative conceptions of 
identity, it is plausible to suggest that welfare state imaginaries have long 
been informed by racially exclusive discourses of national belonging. As with 
the Swedish welfare concept of the folkhem,10 national identity and social 
rights in Britain have had a close and mutually reinforcing relationship. 
                                            
7 Daily Express, ‘Migrants take advantage of generous welfare state’, 20 July, 
2015. Available at: 
http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/592493/Immigrants-
immigration-crisis-Calais-benefits-doctors-NHS [02.10.15]. 
8 Daniel Trilling, Bloody Nasty People, London, Verso, 2012, p93. 
9 Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorschot, ‘Disentangling the “New Liberal 
Dilemma”: On the relation between general welfare redistribution preferences 
and welfare chauvinism’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 53, 
2, (2012), p121. 
10 Andrzej Marcin Suszycki, ‘Nationalism in Sweden and the EU Membership’, 
in Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Andrzej Marcin Suszycki (eds) Nationalism 
and European Integration, London, Continuum, 2007, p.86.  
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Despite internationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-racist currents that suggested 
alternative directions, nineteenth and twentieth-century movements for social 
and economic justice in Britain were inflected by a racialized nationalism, and 
the gains of the British welfare state were not exempt from this. In his history 
of race and class in twentieth-century Britain, Satnam Virdee suggests that 
the incorporation of working class whites into welfare citizenship was 
contiguous with a systematic racism, such that ‘[t]he golden age of welfare 
capitalism and the social democratic settlement was also the golden age of 
white supremacy’.11 The unplanned coincidence of the welfare state and 
postwar immigration – and the absence of any real thinking through of how 
the former might accommodate the latter – mean that racialized nationalism 
was the default setting of mid-century welfare imaginaries: ideas of race and 
nation ‘both underwrote Fabian socialism and were embedded in the 
Beveridge reforms’.12 Given that the British Nationality Act of 1948 was 
prompted by the short-term issue of domestic labour shortage rather than an 
intentional long-term experiment in racial demographics, it can be argued that 
its apparent openness to difference was both unintentional and unwanted. 
Ironically, the founding gesture of multicultural Britain as we know it today was 
made by a political establishment whose normative conception of citizenship 
was still largely predicated on the fantasy of Britain as a white nation. As 
Kathleen Paul suggests, despite the façade of formal equality, policy-makers 
in the postwar decades ‘perceived emigrating UK citizens, immigrating 
                                            
11 Satnam Verdee, Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp.98-9. 
12 Gail Lewis, ‘Welfare settlements and racialising practices’, Soundings, 4, 
(1996), p112. 
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continental and Irish aliens, and migrating subjects of color as belonging to 
different communities of Britishness.’13 During this period a racialized notion of 
‘indigenousness’ remained a ‘significant political calculation’ in Labour Party 
politics.14 
 
Alongside a range of other social norms that were written into the welfare 
state, whiteness was therefore a hidden particularity concealed within the 
discourse of universal welfare citizenship. When we conceive of citizenship 
not as an abstract ideal but as ‘a process, social relation or orientation that 
can be precarious and that must be repeatedly asserted and attained’,15 then 
the uneven distribution of its symbolic and material resources become readily 
apparent.16 While the terms of welfare citizenship for minority subjects have 
been by no means static, the welfare state has always been a racialized 
institution: writing in the mid 1990s about the fields of education and social 
work, Gail Lewis remarks that ‘in charting the history of welfare exclusion and 
marginality it is also possible to narrate a history of the reconstitution of the 
‘coloured immigrant’ into her/his contemporary position as an ‘ethnic 
minority’.17 It is no coincidence that the progressive political struggles in the 
1980s and 90s around race, gender, sexuality, and disability contributed to 
debates about a ‘crisis’ of the welfare state, challenging as they did ‘the 
                                            
13 Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar 
Era, New York, Cornell University Press, 1997, pxii. 
14 Caroline Knowles, Race, Discourse and Labourism, London, Routledge, 
1992, p97. 
15 Andrea Muelebach, The Moral Neoliberal: Welfare and Citizenship in Italy, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2012, p19. 
16 Gail Lewis, Citizenship: Personal Lives and Social Policy, Milton Keynes, 
The Open University, 2004, p10. 
17 Lewis, 1996, op. cit., p111. 
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comfortable imaginary relationship of people, state and social welfare’.18 Yet 
however significant new social movements were in their critique of the 
racialized welfare state, cultural nationalism has never been adequately 
displaced at the normative core of British welfare citizenship. Though the US 
model of welfare citizenship is hardly one to emulate, it provides a useful 
contrast here: while the civil institutionalization of racial inequality eventually 
shaped the terms for the development of America’s civil rights struggles, the 
more longstanding formal equalities of citizenship in Britain have meant that 
the informal terms of British citizenship have not benefited from critical 
interrogation in quite the same ways. Such is the insidiousness of the 
universal. Although antiracisms have repeatedly exposed the racialized 
lineaments of state and civil society, governmental crisis management has 
most commonly responded in a piecemeal fashion: most often, it has been 
community rights not civil rights that have served to smooth out the worst 
excesses of racial inequality.19 
 
In the twenty-first century the inaugural moment of the British welfare state 
continues to be heralded as its ‘golden age’.20 Such evocations will often get 
caught up with a monocultural fantasy of 1950s Britain, serving as a 
benchmark against which subsequent demographic changes are measured. 
Perceived social or cultural problems are then expressed in terms of the 
                                            
18 John Clarke, Gordon Hughes, Gail Lewis and Gerry Mooney, ‘introduction’, 
in G. Hughes (ed.) Imagining Welfare Futures, London, Routledge, 1998, p9.  
19 Gerd Baumann, The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and 
Religious Identities, London, Routledge, 1999, p13. 
20 Daniel Wincott, ‘The (Golden) Age of the Welfare State: interrogating a 
conventional wisdom’, Public Administration, 91, 4, (2013), pp 806-22. 
This is a pre-print version of an article published as Pitcher, B (2016) 'Race, 
Debt and the Welfare State', New Formations, 87: 47-63. 
9 
extent to which they have departed from the foundational conditions of the 
welfare state. And so we get commentators like David Goodhart, editor of 
Prospect magazine, expressing concern with the ways in which cultural 
diversity undermines the social solidarities that sustain the values of the 
welfare state.21 Elsewhere, the authors of a study of East London since the 
late 1950s conjure a homogenous ‘white working class’ as the historical 
subjects of the ‘golden age’, now legitimately resentful of the way an ‘old 
mutualist’ welfare regime has been displaced by a ‘something-for-nothing-
society, in which rights to receive support have manifestly overtaken 
reciprocal obligations to make contributions’.22 Although it is the contribution-
based element in welfare entitlement that is the nominal focus of such 
complaints (supposedly focused on migrants and not racialized minorities per 
se), this is a fulcrum that works to undermine universal welfare provision in 
general. As soon as the question opens up as to degrees of entitlement on 
the basis of longevity of contribution or residence, we move onto a terrain 
whereby the political community is always under threat of being compromised 
by the presence of outsiders, and where in practice white people will tend to 
have an automatic claim to priority as the ur-community of that ‘golden age’. 
In critiques such as these, we are arguably witness not so much to a 
retrenchment of the welfare state’s universal model of citizenship as the 
continuing unfolding of its implicit racial investments. 
 
                                            
21 David Goodhart, ‘Too Diverse?’, Prospect, 96, 2, (2004), pp.30-7. 
22 Geoff Dench, Kate Gavron and Michael Young, The New East End: 
Kinship, Race and Conflict, London, Profile Books, 2006, p207. 
This is a pre-print version of an article published as Pitcher, B (2016) 'Race, 
Debt and the Welfare State', New Formations, 87: 47-63. 
10 
More recent developments in British politics suggest an ongoing continuity in 
the way the racial welfare state has been practiced and imagined. Following 
New Labour’s embrace of communitarian thinkers like Robert Putnam and 
Amitai Etzioni, the tendency known as Blue Labour, led by Labour peer 
Maurice Glassman, is characterized by a nostalgic articulation of collectivity, 
morality and citizenship. Policies put in place between 2010-15 by the 
Conservative-led coalition government intensified the policing of welfare 
entitlement, effectively requiring front-line NHS medical treatment to serve as 
a checkpoint for the UK Border Agency. The new Tory regime’s response to 
the 2015 European ‘refugee crisis’ paints a familiar picture of struggling 
‘schools and hospitals and core infrastructure’ and a ‘cohesive society’ under 
threat.23 In the realm of housing policy, it is widely recognized that forms of 
‘austerity urbanism’24 like the capping of benefit payments have a 
disproportionate impact on minority communities.25 Rather than being residual 
phenomena, it is plausible that in recent decades there has been an 
accentuation and acceleration of implicitly racialized distinctions in welfare 
citizenship, as Britain experiences the playing out of a widespread global shift 
in national imaginaries ‘from a state-based and thus political identification with 
nationality to a culture-based concept of the nation as a site of integrated 
                                            
23 Independent, ‘Theresa May’s Speech to the Conservative Party Conference 
– in full’, 6 October. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-s-speech-to-the-
conservative-party-conference-in-full-a6681901.html [07.10.15]. 
24 Chris Hamnett, ‘Shrinking the welfare state: the structure, geography and 
impact of British government benefit cuts’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 39, 4, (2014), p491. 
25 DWP, Household Benefit Cap Equality Impact Assessment, 2011, Available 
at: www.parliament.uk/documents/impact-assessments/IA11-041A.pdf 
[18.08.14]. 
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social membership’,26 where issues relating to citizenship and welfare come to 
be addressed ‘as matters of culture and ethnicity’27 and collective goods are 
‘authorized by a shared identity’.28 Despite the pluralistic character of 
contemporary Scottish nationalism, moves towards fiscal independence within 
Britain’s constituent nations will most likely accentuate culture’s role in 
underwriting welfare. Although there are undoubtledly strong cosmopolitan 
tendencies in demotic iterations of British national culture, the backward-
looking tendencies I have surveyed here suggest that welfare continues to be 
marked by anachronistic conceptions of entitlement and belonging. While the 
British welfare state has adapted, albeit slowly and inadequately, to other 
social and cultural changes – consider how the Beveridge report assumes 
female dependence on the male wage29 – race presents a persistent 
challenge to its supposedly universal character. 
 
The racialization of welfare imaginaries poses some important questions, 
then, for political projects interested in defending the idea of the British 
welfare state and working on the powerful attachments and investments that 
palpably still exist for it. Clearly the figuration of a straightforward return to an 
anachronistic model of welfare citizenship is undesirable given the implicit 
racial investments I have just glossed, and so such projects have to do quite a 
                                            
26 Lauren Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to Washington City, Essays 
on Sexual Citizenship, Durham, Duke University Press, 1997, p3. 
27 Ferruh Yilmaz, ‘From immigrant worker to Muslim immigrant: challenges for 
feminism’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 22, 1, (2015) p12. 
28 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Theory from the South or, How Euro-
America is Evolving Towards Africa, London, Paradigm Publishers, 2012, 
p68. 
29 Rosemary Sales, ‘The deserving and undeserving? Refugees, asylum 
seekers and welfare in Britain’, Critical Social Policy, 22, 3, (2002), p456. 
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bit of work to adequately reimagine welfare citizenship if it is to be fit for 
purpose for twenty-first century multicultural Britain. If the politics of austerity 
is – as critiques of neoliberal retrenchment have long suggested – indeed 
engaged in the ‘dismantling’ of the welfare state,30 a politically progressive 
challenge to this practice should involve no simple reassembly of component 
parts. Such mechanistic metaphors fail, of course, to capture not only the 
problems and imperfections of the postwar welfare state, but also the need to 
think about the mutable character of welfare as describing social processes 
that necessarily involve transformations across space and time. Opposition to 
‘dismantling’ must involve attempts to reform and restructure in some 
fundamental ways the dominant logics of welfare citizenship.  
 
As a contribution to this project, what I want to do in the rest of this article is to 
take seriously the possibility that neoliberal attacks, displacements and 
replacements of welfare might in some quarters have some significant 
purchase and appeal. As Michael A. Kaplan suggests of liberal imaginaries, to 
advance a critique of neoliberalism requires ‘a nuanced understanding of its 
rhetorical efficacy’.31 If, as I have just suggested, the putative universalism of 
welfare citizenship conceals hidden particularisms, then how might posited 
alternatives to the welfare state appear to certain subjects to provide a more 
egalitarian model of social relations? As debt becomes increasingly central to 
                                            
30 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Regan, Thatcher and the 
Politics of Retrenchment, Cambridge, CUP, 1994.  
31 Michael A. Kaplan, Friendship Fictions: The Rhetoric of Citizenship in the 
Liberal Imaginary, Tuscaloosa, The University of Alabama Press, 2010, p4. 
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the economic organization of the industrialized world,32 we appear to be 
moving away from a model of citizen-state relations predicated on welfare to 
one based on household debt. As neoliberalism encourages its subjects to 
self-invest as ‘financialized human capital’,33 then might indebtedness have a 
particular appeal to minority subjects who have historically been marginalized 
in a prevailing regime of welfare citizenship? As a way in to the consideration 
of these questions, I want first to address the relationship between racialized 




Minorities and neoliberal culture 
In an article for this journal, Paul Gilroy outlines the ‘seductions of a 
vernacular neoliberalism’,34 specifically the appeal of aspirational 
individualism, bolstered by the rhetoric of self-improvement and self-
responsibility, to racialized minorities in Britain. He ends by asking  ‘whether 
an authentic liberatory moment might […] reside in postcolonial peoples and 
minority ethnic groups being just as selfish, ignorant, right-wing and 
conservative as everybody else?’35 Gilroy’s cynical provocation that this 
                                            
32 Andrew Ross ‘The Politics of Debt Resistance’, New Labor Forum, 22, 3, 
2013, pp.12-15. 
33 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, 
New York, Zone Books, 2015, p. 33.  
34 Paul Gilroy, ‘“…We Got to Get Over Before We Go Under…” Fragments for 
a History of Black Vernacular Neoliberalism’, New Formations, 80-81, 2013, 
p26. 
35 Ibid., p36. 
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moment might be read ‘as a new index of Britain’s integration’36 is a pertinent 
observation, and is worth considering in the context of the present discussion. 
The obvious recognition that neoliberal orientations are not simply imposed 
from without onto racialized minorities but also involve forms of participation 
and collaboration37 provides an opportunity to think about some of the factors 
that might be involved in neoliberal culture’s appeal as an alternative to the 
welfare state.  
 
There is perhaps some truth in ex-Prime Minister John Major’s recent claim 
that the ‘guts and the drive’ of postwar immigrants can be attributed to a ‘very 
Conservative instinct’ to ‘better themselves and their families’38 so long as this 
conservatism is largely understood in anti-statist (rather than pro-Tory) terms. 
Gargi Bhattacharyya suggests that ostensible passivity towards to the 
encroachment of neoliberalism is explained by a ‘disappointment or 
scepticism towards the state’ amongst minorities in Britain, and a ‘widespread 
cynicism towards official solutions’. Strategies of self-reliance and the pursuit 
of community-focused practices are the means by which some racialized 
minorities have bypassed unproductive engagement with the welfare state.39 
The exponential rise of a phenomenon like ‘prosperity theology’ (‘the 
                                            
36 Ibid. 
37 Lester K. Spence, ‘The neoliberal turn in black politics’, Souls: A Critical 
Journal of Black Politics, Culture and Society, 14, 3-4, pp139-59. 
38 Jessica Elgot, ‘John Major Praises “Guts and Drive” Of Immigrants, And 
Says They Have “Very Conservative Instinct”, 13 August 2014. Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/08/13/john-major-
immigration_n_5673844.html [18.08.2014]. 
39 Gargi Bhattacharyya, ‘Racial Neoliberal Britain?’, in N. Kapoor, V. S. Kalra 
and J. Rhodes (eds) The State of Race, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013, pp45-6. 
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organization of religion around the goal of future prosperity’) amongst the 
African Christian diaspora40 deserves to be understood in this context. In 
Gilroy’s analysis, the systematic racist experience of ‘being denied recognition 
as an individual’ strengthens the appeal of neoliberalism’s ‘extreme 
individualism’.41 The entrepreneurial path of autonomy and self-employment 
has long provided an alternative for those who have otherwise been shut out 
of the networks, relations and institutions of power and privilege.42 The 
relative visibility of minorities in lower-ranking local government, health and 
care sector employment does not mitigate significant absences in the higher 
echelons of the institutions of the welfare state.43 Indeed, there is a sense in 
which minorities’ widespread public sector employment in the postwar welfare 
state’s so-called ‘golden age’ tells a generational story about relative 
disadvantage and necessarily modest ambition from which subsequent 
generations are understandably keen to distance themselves.  
 
The neoliberal orientations I have just sketched out are also part of a story 
about the rise of the black middle-class, surburbanization, and an 
accompanying culture of aspiration.44 As in the United States, where access 
                                            
40 Bev Skeggs, ‘Values beyond value? Is anything beyond the logic of 
capital?’, The British Journal of Sociology, 65, 1, (2014), p2. 
41 Gilroy, op. cit., p35. 
42 Javed Hussain, Jonathan Scott and Paul Hannon, ‘The new generation: 
characteristics and motivations of BME graduate entrepreneurs’, Education 
and Training, 50, 7, 2008, p. 583. 
43 See, for example, Denis Campbell, ‘NHS boss Simon Stevens criticises 
lack of diversity in management’, Guardian, 21 May 2014. Available at:  
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/may/21/nhs-boss-simon-stevens-
criticises-lack-diversity-management [21.10.14]. 
44 See Tim Butler and Chris Hamnett, Ethnicity, Class and Aspiration: 
Understanding London’s New East End, Bristol, Policy Press, 2011.  
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to commodities and participation in consumer culture have proven to be key 
sites in the struggle for racial equality,45 the marketplace has and continues to 
facilitate forms of social citizenship that may rival, supplement or replace more 
official versions. Class mobility is a possibility for some even as free markets 
reduce the average prospects for minorities as a whole. In the US, 
commentators lament the ‘erosion of a black public sphere’46 and chart the 
emergence of new forms of black politics that make a distinct and intentional 
break with the civil rights tradition.47 While in Britain a black public sphere has 
only ever been inchoate, there is a definite shift in the register of minority 
politics where incorporation has resulted in certain trade-offs that have been 
played out in state institutions and public bodies: consider, for example, the 
way in which the dedicated Commission for Racial Equality was so neatly 
folded into the underfunded Equality and Human Rights Commission.48 
Middle-class minorities can be understood in the context of what David Theo 
Goldberg calls ‘the postracial contemporary’49 where dominant narratives of 
official multiculture depend upon and feed off the social and economic 
success of a small tranche of visible minorities.  
 
                                            
45 Roopali Mukherjee, ‘Bling Fling: Commodity Consumption and the Politics 
of the “Post-Racial”’, in M. G. Lacy and Kent A. Ono (eds), Critical Rhetorics 
of Race, New York, New York University Press, 2011, p184. 
46 Robin D. G. Kelley ‘Neoliberalism’s Challenge’, Boston Review, 2012. 
Available at: http://www.bostonreview.net/challenge-neoliberalism [21.10.14]. 
47 Ben Pitcher, ‘Obama and the Politics of Blackness: anti-racism in the “post-
black” conjuncture, Souls, 12, 4, pp313-22. 
48 Sylvia Walby, Jo Armstrong and Sofia Strid, ‘Intersectionality and the 
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cit. 
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From a certain position of critique, the contradictions of the postracial 
contemporary might be understood and lamented as involving ‘a relation of 
attachment’ among minority subjects ‘to compromised conditions of 
possibility’.50 Yet while there may be currency in the charge that some 
minority elites have colluded in the further entrenchment of ‘intra-racial 
inequality’,51 and that minorities might have ‘most to lose from neoliberal 
practices’,52 it is premature to reduce the attractions of neoliberal culture to 
some form of false consciousness, or to only conceptualize minorities as the 
constitutive limit of neoliberal subjectivity.53 We might, I want to suggest, make 
a reading of Gilroy’s ‘vernacular neoliberalism’ amongst minority subjects as 
at least in part produced through the failure of more egalitarian and 
redistributive welfare imaginaries to shed their racial exclusivity. It is the left’s 
attachment to such imaginaries that we might, therefore, better understand in 
terms of Berlant’s ‘cruel optimism’. Such a perspective should simultaneously 
remind us that the critique of neoliberal practice begins on the wrong foot if it 
invests in a fantasy of the entrepreneurial minority as the neoliberal subject 
par excellence. I want in the section that follows to extend the idea that 
‘vernacular neoliberalism’ amongst minoritized subjects in contemporary 
Britain might give a particular cadency to the accumulation of household debt. 
It will be my suggestion that a focus on debt could provide us with some ways 
into understanding what neoliberal markets may offer that the welfare state 
does not, and that we might seek to borrow elements of neoliberal culture in 
                                            
50 Lauren Berlant, ‘Cruel Optimism’, Differences, 17, 3, (2006), p21. 
51 Spence, op. cit., p146. 
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our ‘defence’ of the welfare state and in attempts to elaborate more racially 
egalitarian versions of or alternatives to welfare citizenship.  
 
Two caveats are necessary before I do this. Firstly, I’d like to foreground the 
sense in which this is a speculative discussion, developed out of the two 
arguments this article has so far glossed: to acknowledge the racialization of 
welfare citizenship in Britain and, relatedly, the differential positioning of some 
minority subjects towards neoliberal culture, is to open up the possibility that 
neoliberal debt culture may provide a meaningful substitute to the welfare 
state for some minoritized Britons. I do not set out to provide an empirical 
account, but rather to advance some necessarily provisional ideas about the 
potentially attractive features of indebtedness. Secondly, I want to stress that 
the example I will elaborate below – the imposition of debt culture in British 
Higher Education (HE) – has its own specificity, and should not be taken for 
an argument about the working of debt in general. Although I hope that this 
example might have wider relevance to understanding the relationship 
between debt, welfare citizenship and the British welfare state, it has some 
special characteristics: despite an apparent ideological convergence between 
business and state in neoliberal culture, there remains a great deal of 
difference between public and private institutions of debt, between student 
loans and payday loans. While it should be clear that I am in no way 
attempting to exonerate neoliberal debt culture as a just and viable alternative 
to the welfare state, I am interested here in challenging the self-evidence of 
claims that debt is ‘[o]bviously […] a negative subjection’ that ‘leads only to 
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repressive and regressive subjectification’54 in the belief that such generalized 
accounts of indebtedness flatten out the ‘innumerable ways in which different 
financial instruments are organized, encountered, and come to resonate with 
daily life’,55 including, potentially, the complex roles they might play in 
processes of racial formation.  
 
 
The equality of debtors 
In The Making of the Indebted Man, Maurizio Lazzarato describes the 
neoliberal attack on welfare states, and the replacement of social rights with 
social debts.56 Lazzarato’s account of these transformations is particularly 
strong in its descriptions of the production of indebted subjects. As the 
disciplined subjects of welfare states are replaced by the debtor subjects of 
neoliberal control societies, individualized debt becomes the paradigmatic 
social relation, and cynical entrepreneurialism erodes the horizontal 
solidarities of welfare democracy. Capitalism’s new subjective regime is 
testament to the power of debt as a structuring force and, consequently, the 
sheer ubiquity of neoliberal relations. As Lazzarato writes, ‘the condition of the 
indebted man [sic] now occupies the totality of public space’.57 Debt is, in his 
                                            
54 Lazzarato, 2014, op. cit., p10. 
55 Joe Deville and Gregory J Seigworth ‘Everyday Debt and Credit’, Cultural 
Studies, 29, 5-6, (2015), p.619. 
56 Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the 
Neoliberal Condition, Amsterdam, Semiotext(e), 2012. 
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analysis, the ‘universal power relation to which every individual in capitalist 
networks of accumulation is subjected’.58 
 
It is in recognition of debt’s totalizing dominance that it becomes possible to 
build a crucial supplementary account of neoliberalism’s interpellative appeal, 
for the universalization of debt relations brings with it a semblance of equal 
treatment. Initially we might understand this in terms of social class. While of 
course the unequal resources of debtor subjects makes notional equality 
illusory (for indebtedness is always shorter and cheaper and therefore 
qualitatively different for those with more economic resources), I want to 
suggest in what follows that the universal burden of indebtedness can give the 
impression of a kind of social levelling that was perhaps less evident in the 
case of the (actually redistributive) welfare state. The resonance of debt 
regimes to working class subjects is, I will suggest, to some extent predicated 
on that powerful claim to equality and entitlement based on the abstract 
quality of money: the notion that one’s money is as good as anyone else’s. 
The political proponents of neoliberal debt culture in Britain appear to have 
made impressive use of debt’s intelligibility. Like the fiction of market freedom, 
it ‘provides its subjects with a “lived” “imaginary relation” to their real 
conditions of existence’.59 It is the uncomfortable fact of money’s ‘qualitatively 
communistic character’60 that, I want to suggest, surely played a part in 
                                            
58 James Muldoon ‘Lazzarato and the Micro-Politics of Invention’, Theory, 
Culture and Society, 31, 6, (2014), pp57-76. 
59 Stuart Hall, The Neo-Liberal Revolution, Cultural Studies, 25, 6, (2011), 
p716. 
60 Simmel, op. cit., p445. 
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underwriting the widespread acceptance of recent transformations in British 
higher education. 
 
The financing of British HE has shifted fairly rapidly from a model of general 
taxation with maintenance grants in the late 1980s to a loan-based model 
requiring students to pay annual tuition fees, currently set in England at 
£9,000.61 The widening of HE provision has gone hand in hand with its 
neoliberalization, and indebtedness now describes the terms of participation, 
inaugurating in Britain what American commentators have called an 
‘indentured class’ of student debtors62. The last five years have seen an 
intensified process of privatization, deregulation and commodification, where 
HE is presented as ‘a private benefit to the individual consumer [and] a 
financial asset where the return on investment is seen in higher earnings upon 
graduation.’63 The implementation of this debt regime is undoubtedly 
smoothed by the continuing orthodoxy that HE is a mechanism of social 
mobility. While current conditions for working-class and other non-traditional 
students are markedly different from those of grant-era HE, and while these 
conditions may affect in radical ways the choices students make over what, 
how and why they study, there is (for those who obtain the grades) little option 
today of not going to university at all.  
 
                                            
61 Devolutionary arrangements have meant that Wales, Northern Ireland and 
(most significantly) Scotland have some variations on this model. 
62 G. Thomas Goodnight, David Hingstman & Sandy Green, The Student 
Debt Bubble, Journal of Cultural Economy, 8, 1, (2015), p.83.  
63 Andrew McGettigan, The Great University Gamble: money, markets and the 
future of higher education, London, Pluto Press, 2013, p.9. 
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 Whether the new constituency of student consumers are buoyed by a culture 
of expectation that now takes HE for granted, or whether they are making 
modest calculations in a zero-sum game where a degree still provides 
protection from the lowest strata of low-paid and precarious employment, 
participation in UK HE has yet to stall or go into decline. Contrary to evidence 
from the early 2000s suggesting that ‘debt aversion’ is a deterrent to HE entry 
at the lower end of the social spectrum,64 HE entry rates of students from 
‘disadvantaged backgrounds’ continue to rise year on year.65 The most recent 
application figures show that ‘application rates of 18-year-olds living in poor 
areas in all four countries of the UK have increased to the highest levels 
recorded.’66 Although the current UK HE debt regime has led to a fall in 
applications from more wealthy students, those from lower socio-economic 
groups ‘express a strong belief in the ability of higher education to offer them 
greater opportunities and incomes than would otherwise be available.’67 A 
recent typology of indebtedness amongst English students finds that the 
‘debt-positive’ are ‘disproportionately drawn from lower income families and 
                                            
64 Universities UK, Attitudes to Debt, 2003. Available at: 
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Pages/StudentDebtSummary.
aspx [6.05.15]. 
65 UCAS, ‘Record 8% more students from disadvantaged backgrounds get 
into university’ press release, 14 August 2014. Available at: 
http://www.ucas.com/news-events/news/2014/more-students-disadvantaged-
backgrounds-get-university [18.08.14]. See also UCAS ‘2013 Application 
Cycle: End of Cycle Report’, 2013. Available at: http://www.ucas.com/data-
analysis/key-analysis [18.08.14]. 
66 Press Association, ‘Low-income students more likely than ever to apply to 
university, Ucas says’, Guardian, 30 January 2015. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jan/30/low-income-students-
likely-apply-university-ucas [8.10.15]. 
67 Neil Harrison, Steve Agnew and Joyce Serido ‘Attitudes to debt among 
indebted undergraduates: A cross-national explanatory factor analysis’, 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 46, (2015), p70. 
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deprived areas.’68 Whatever factors are involved here (and they are likely to 
be complex), it is clear for the time being at least that the self-investment 
sales patter of successive governments has not significantly deterred working-
class students from the accumulation of education debt. 
 
Without playing down the negative dimensions of HE debt, we might 
speculate that it has given many working class students and their families a 
set of coordinates to navigate the otherwise difficult-to-read cultural terrain of 
tertiary education. There’s arguably a kind of conceptual democratization at 
work here where the market opens up imaginative possibilities for some 
subjects even as it closes down their opportunities. The ideological function of 
indebtedness in securing the legitimacy of the HE marketplace will doubtless 
continue beyond the point when it does, eventually, become a significant 
deterrent to participation, as neoliberal restructuring manages a shift from 
increasingly unacceptable – and culturally opaque – criteria of exclusion 
(products of elitism, cultural privilege, even evaluations of ‘intelligence’) to a 
single legitimate – and, importantly, intelligible – criterion of exclusion 
(unaffordability). Under the levelling aegis of debt, all will be theoretically 
entitled to HE, but not everyone will be in a position to purchase it.  
 
Race is of course more than just a modality of class, and the equalitarian 
rhetoric of indebtedness might be said to have a specific appeal to some 
racialized subjects. At their inception, all HE debts are written onto clean 
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slates. While the outcomes of indebtedness in HE will be radically dissimilar, 
the generic front end of debt relations present themselves as a universal fact 
of life. The bureaucracies of its debt are simple and streamlined, like the 
never-read click-through small print to which all young people are necessarily 
now familiarized through software licenses, phone contracts, or UCAS 
university application forms. So often when scholars of race think critically 
about ‘colourblind’ orientations to the subject our objective is to problematize 
white investments in the denial of racial significance,69 but of course debt also 
presents a figuration of racial transcendence capable of servicing the 
aspirations of some minority subjects who might otherwise be shut out of or 
marginalized within the culture and institutions of the welfare state: it is 
possible to visualize the debt system as an ‘equal-opportunity oppressor’.70 
While, because they describe equal parties to a contract, creditor-debtor 
relations are premised on a notion of legal equality,71 they can be said to 
retain an intrinsic imbalance of value in so far as they involve the extraction of 
interest by the creditor. By contrast there remains an identity and a semblance 
of equality between debtor subjects under the auspices of formally equivalent 
debt regimes. Student debtors, drawing on hypothetical future earnings 
calculated using the variable of hope, all appear to be in the same boat. 
Ironically, it is the very clarity of these abstracted relations of indebtedness – 
the way they make sense outside of culture and enculturation – that helps to 
                                            
69 See, for example, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists: color-
blind racism and the persistence of racial inequality in America, fourth edition, 
Lanham, MA, 2014.  
70 Yates McKee, ‘Debt: Occupy, Postcontemporary Art, and the Aesthetics of 
Debt Resistance’, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 112, 4, (2013), p797. 
71 David Graeber, Debt: The First Five Thousand Years, New York, Melville 
House Publishing, 2011, p86. 
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cover over the racialized inequalities of debt relations. While in the past 
unequal access to finance made ‘credit equality’ an issue in the politics of 
class, race and gender,72 contemporary HE debt is offered to all comers on 
scrupulously equal terms. The (failing) competitive market of HE has set 
tuition fees at the same rate for all institutions, and maintenance loans are of 
an identical value (with the exception of London weighting). In the face of the 
possibility that the ideal model of debtor subjectivity in UK HE might appear to 
discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims, the British government has 
consulted and intends to legislate on a ‘Sharia compliant alternative finance 
product’ to work around Islamic objections to the charging of above-inflation 
interest on loans. Now even those with a theological objection have the 
opportunity to take on ‘identical’ levels of indebtedness to ‘traditional’ 
debtors.73 
 
Any apparent enthusiasm for higher education debt by no means invalidates 
protest against it. The US experience is salutary: the average African-
American student is saddled with nearly 30 per cent more debt than the 
average white student,74 and is as a result four times more likely to default.75 
                                            
72 For an overview of US debates, see Louis Hyman, Ending Discrimination, 
Legitimating Debt: The Political Economy of Race, Gender and Credit Access 
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73 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Sharia-Compliant Student 
Finance, 2014, p6. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/sharia-compliant-student-
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This disproportionate debt burden is being accrued in a context where the 
‘wealth gap ratio’ between black and white in the States – which closed up a 
little in the early 1990s – is now quite rapidly increasing.76 These facts pretty 
much speak for themselves. And yet if we focus solely on the inegalitarian 
outcomes that such debts inevitably accrue, it is easy to play down the 
potentially attractive qualities of debt regimes and the complexly generative 
role debt might have to play in racial formation.77 Indebtedness does not 
simply persuade debtor subjects to act against their own interests (however 
they might be defined), but could actively produce ways of thinking, acting and 
relating that might provide credible, desirable – even ‘better’ – alternatives to 
those they replace. While the question of defining ‘interests’ might appear 
relatively unproblematic (surely the collectivization of education debt is 
preferable to its individualization?) it is my contention that the self-evidence of 
this analysis presupposes a form of subject-state relations that has become 
increasingly anachronistic. To demand the restitution of an earlier entitlement 
– like free education – takes for granted a symbolic affinity with the citizen-
subject of the postwar social democratic settlement. This is an affinity that we 
cannot take for granted amongst anyone who grew up in neoliberal Britain, 
and particularly for those whose racialization already marginalizes them within 
dominant regimes of welfare citizenship. In so far as the uneven but 
undeniable victories in the struggle for racial equality in Britain have coincided 
– from the 1970s onwards – with the rise of neoliberalism, it seems plausible 
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to suggest that the imaginative resources of neoliberal culture have with time 
become more available to racialized minorities than those of a fading, racially 
marked, social democracy. Such a shift is also consonant with the general 
decline in support for the welfare state amongst each successive postwar 
generation.78 
 
The futurity of debt 
There is more to the potential appeal of debt than just the initial veneer of 
equality between debtors. Following Nietzsche, Lazzarato makes future 
relations central to his understanding of debt. While he is right in his 
estimation that enslaving debt obligations allow capitalism to exercise ‘control 
over the future’ by influencing the thinking and behaviour of the governed,79 
these same debt relations might additionally be understood as producing a 
variety of belonging. Crucially, the future orientation of the debt relation 
sutures the debtor to a version of the social; obligations to the future describe 
an entitlement to exist and persist, if only to repay debt. While the futurity of 
debt may also be rightly problematized for the normative baggage it implies,80 
the temporal structure of debt culture offers a model of collectivity very 
different from backward-looking (racially static if not racially homogenous) 
                                            
78 See Bobby Duffy, Suzanne Hall, Duncan O’Leary and Sarah Pope, 
Generation Strains: A Demos and Ipsos MORI report on changing attitudes to 
welfare, London, Demos, 2013. Available at: 
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logics of community. As Richard Dienst has suggested, indebtedness 
‘articulates the historicity of life, that is, life insofar as it becomes social and is 
lived in common’.81  
 
The moral onus of indebtedness is likewise future-facing, and it is easy to see 
how the obligation on debtor subjects to prove themselves and make good 
their debt is preferable to being judged wanting from the outset in a racialized 
regime of welfare citizenship. Even when the future to which debt binds is 
circumscribed and reduced by that debt – when in a sense it ‘belongs’ to the 
creditor – it is nevertheless a future on which debtor subjects have an 
unequivocal claim. Debt’s negative entitlement hardly paints a rosy picture, 
but neoliberal rationality makes the future that debt describes a plausible one, 
and the possibility of against-the-odds success sweetens more realist 
assessments that some future is better than no future at all. Debt’s hardships 
are leavened by this concoction of realism and hope. In the case of HE, the 
threat of abject alternatives couples with education’s obdurate tendency to 
channel future-oriented desires for social mobility and self-improvement (a 
trajectory that for minoritized subjects parallels and in part feeds off the 
teleological character of anti-racist desire). While Lazzarato’s intention is to 
disparage when he writes that solvency has become a measure of morality,82 
the subsumption of morality to economic measurement can be read as 
another universalizing and simplifying process that transforms opaque and 
exclusionary forms of cultural distinction into ‘inclusionary’ economic relations. 
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When debt takes on an ontological role in the constitution of social relations, 
its significance exceeds any empirical measure of impoverishment. If it is out 
of debt that we derive legitimacy, self-respect and (however paradoxically) 
entitlement, then the brute economics of debt’s burden become relegated as a 
secondary concern.  
 
These possibilities that inhere in the futurial orientation of debt do not negate 
the long-recognized tendencies Lazzarato foregrounds for debt to induce 
forms of self-repressive subjectivation. It is quite plausible that in the long run 
the shame of debt wins out, but it is equally possible that debt’s enhanced role 
in ‘a new consumer culture of social entitlement’ is significantly loosening the 
moral (and linguistic) relationship between debt and guilt.83 It is worth 
entertaining the likelihood that in some circumstances debt may open up as 
well as close down possibilities for some subjects in neoliberal Britain. Could 
debt provide the ground to a qualitatively new politics of belonging that is not 
entirely undermined by the inequalities it so evidently produces? Critique of 
the latter does not diminish the former: while it’s impossible to fault the 
economic logic of calls for debt resistance pioneered in the US by groups like 
Strike Debt,84 we might question the extent to which debt resistance alone is 
capable of furnishing the ontological ground that debt relations provide. In 
turn, this may play a part in explaining why it is that in the US there is a 
‘frequent impression that the political project of debt resistance is somehow 
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limited to privileged white people’.85 In Lazzarato’s own terms, indebtedness 
can be said to involve a ‘mixed semiotics’,86 processing debtor subjectivity in 
terms that are both signifying and asignifying, by degrees simultaneously 
molar and molecular.87 Effective protest against and alternatives to 
indebtedness must recognize and operate on both representational and 
nonrepresentational terrain. Like any viable alternative to the political 
orthodoxies of austerity Britain, they must succeed in capturing the 
investments of subjects for whom the narratives, dispositions, practices and 
styles of neoliberalism presently delineate the most attractive and convincing 
of futures.  
 
Post-national futures 
However contradictory as political projects, the futurial orientation of neoliberal 
debt relations resonates in some respects with the foundational ethos of the 
postwar welfare state. To look back at this moment three quarters of a century 
ago is sometimes to lose sight of its future-facing character, where the welfare 
state did not describe something achieved but rather the hope, possibility and 
promise of a programme for the future. If we use neoliberal debt relations to 
think about the terms with which we might reimagine the welfare state, we 
draw attention to the temporalities of the present-future. Debt serves to make 
sense of social relations and models ‘investment’ in a shared future. Such a 
perspective helps to shake off the implicit investments of welfare imaginaries 
in the mythic, racialized ground of national belonging, and turns us towards 
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the temporally specific place of the present. The claim to welfare is then 
absolutely not rooted in history and genealogy, but in the contingent situation 
of the present time and place. The demythologization of welfare is a naming 
of needs, rights and obligations that makes a clear break with notions of 
accrued generational service to the nation, to versions of community, social or 
cultural solidarity or belonging that still subtly inform dominant articulations of 
welfare citizenship. To follow the lead modelled by neoliberal debt helps us to 
conceive of welfare in a present where there is no question of who is more or 
less entitled, more or less deserving of better or preferential treatment.  
 
The problem, of course, is that the universal welfare model implied here is a 
unpopular one, and those seeking to stem declining support for the British 
welfare state still tend to look to practices that return us to an implictly 
racialized terrain of differential entitlement based on differential 
contributions.88 There are no easy answers to the problem of developing 
progressive political imaginaries to work against neoliberalism’s continuing 
hold on austerity Britain, but it is my argument here that thinking about debt’s 
appeal provides us with an opportunity to understand what is insufficient 
about such backward-looking solutions. The straightforward ‘reassembly’ of 
the ‘dismantled’ ‘golden age’ British welfare state is an unviable project, and 
not only on account of the unacceptability of its tacit racial exclusions. Like the 
material/symbolic defences of national integrity that Wendy Brown describes 
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as symptomatic of the dissolution of nation-state sovereignty,89 the idealized 
postwar welfare state and the Marshallian model of social citizenship that 
comes with it are in some respects little more than comforting phantoms, 
produced by a nostalgia for a political imaginary whose efficacy has long 
since passed. Longstanding ‘connections forged between nationality, nation-
ness and citizenship’ have been subject to an ‘unbundling’,90 and those of us 
who want to ‘defend’ the idea of the welfare state are kidding ourselves if we 
think that we can (or should) just bundle these up together again as if the 
profound transformations of the last 70 odd years could be written off or put 
into reverse.   
 
What might stand in as viable successors and alternatives still remains to be 
developed, but it seems clear that the task of imagining the ‘culture, habits, 
virtues and practices of participatory democracy’ in ‘our age of migration’ 
requires a ‘thinner’ embedding in ethno-national norms.91 Again, neoliberal 
debt does not provide an answer in itself, but it gestures in a direction beyond 
the realm of dominant welfare imaginaries, of both left and right. While 
neoliberalism is necessarily stabilized and expressed in localized (typically 
national) cultural and political formations,92 it simultaneously possesses a 
transnational logic that is not necessarily attached to or invested in any 
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particular iteration. The model of markets and consumer debt operates easily 
within a global, transnational framework. Debt produces a familiar, universally 
translatable set of reference points, particularly for increasing numbers of us 
who self-identify in diasporic and transnational terms. Rather than think about 
minority subjects only as the most acute victims of neoliberalism’s incursions 
on the welfare state, we might consider how they may also possess some of 
the orientations and conceptual resources with which to develop forms of 
rights and entitlement beyond national(ist) regimes of welfare citizenship.93 
 
The once culturally specific model of the ‘American dream’ has mutated to 
become a lingua franca of global neoliberal aspiration, and the validity of 
narratives of indebtedness is confirmed and consolidated within a global 
frame where the private provision of social goods like HE is rapidly expanding 
at the expense of the public sector.94 Even as debt serves as an instrument of 
control, it remains a marker of capitalist incorporation, distinguishing debtor 
subjects from the ‘three-quarters of humanity’ who remain ‘too poor for debt’.95 
There are lessons that we might learn from debt relations in the global South, 
which after all has had ‘a rather longer (and harsher) exposure’ than the North 
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to the rigours of fiscal austerity.96 The global South has not only served as a 
‘petri dish’ for neoliberal experiments now being exported to Euro-America. 
Unshackled from the teleology of European modernisation, southern 
modernities are altering planetary practices and producing new ‘idioms of 
work, time, and value’. The minimally regulated, highly flexible informal 
economies of the global south foreshadow Euro-American futures.97 The 
moment of globalized neoliberal capitalism threatens longstanding political 
imaginaries precisely because it requires us to contemplate some radically 
post-national forms of political organization. Its logic continues to be resisted 
in welfare debates on the left for the legitimate reason that welfare citizenship 
within a global, transnational frame seems such a unrealistic and unfeasibly 
cosmopolitan project in the current historical moment. Recent judgments 
against ‘economically inactive’ EU migrants suggest a retrenchment of 
supranational welfare citizenship within austerity Europe,98 and the current 
political opportunities to reverse this trend seem slight. And yet it’s clear that 
the forms of welfare subjectivity prefigured by neoliberal debt regimes also 
delineate emergent possibilities for post-national political projects of social 
welfare, social democracy, and economic redistribution. 
 
Learning from neoliberalism 
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To be quite clear, it is not my suggestion here that neoliberalism’s creation of 
debtor subjects should be applauded as an unequivocally positive 
development in the struggle against racialized disadvantage, discrimination, 
and subjugation. The displacement of publics by markets, the privatization of 
social goods and the desperately unequal burden of individualized debt is not 
somehow mitigated by the way it might model racial equality and hope for the 
future, however convincingly it might do this. The racial politics of neoliberal 
debt can also work to reinscribe and reinforce the terms of racial difference, 
such as through the financialization of ‘subprime subjects’ in contemporary 
‘technologies of racial finance’.99 Debt culture is by no stretch of the 
imagination a straightforward ‘answer’ to the inequalities of our profoundly 
racialized social formations. What I’m trying to suggest, nevertheless, is that it 
is a dangerous mistake to ignore the possibility of debt’s resonant appeal in 
our ‘defence’ of that which it replaces and displaces. I’m suggesting that there 
might be lessons we can learn from a clear-sighted consideration of neoliberal 
debt culture, particularly as it appears to tackle (if only on a ‘symbolic’ level) 
the inequalities that persist in dominant articulations of welfare citizenship. 
While it is important to be cautious of lending capitalism too much causal 
power in understanding the complexity of racial formation,100 its potential to 
level, subvert and antiquate entrenched cultural hierarchies has of course 
been long recognized,101 and what might be glossed as the forces of 
                                            
99 Zenia Kish and Justin Leroy, Bonded Life, Cultural Studies, 29, 5-6, 
(2015), 630-651. 
100 Ben Pitcher, ‘Race and Capitalism Redux’, Patterns of Prejudice, 46, 1, 
(2012), pp1-15. 
101 Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1992.  
This is a pre-print version of an article published as Pitcher, B (2016) 'Race, 
Debt and the Welfare State', New Formations, 87: 47-63. 
36 
neoliberal globalization suggest some powerful contemporary alternatives to 
welfare citizenship from which we might also stand to learn.  
 
In her account of welfare and citizenship in Italy, Andrea Muelebach suggests 
that neoliberal morality, as practiced in acts of charity, is best seen not as the 
straightforward product of market rationality, but as existing in ‘productive 
tension’ with it. If it is right to suggest that ‘neoliberalism is a force that can 
contain its negation’,102 then critical projects interested in ‘defending’ the 
welfare state might have much to learn from its ‘dismantling’. The abstract, 
universal and impersonal qualities of debt produce forms of neoliberal society 
and citizenship relations that are in certain respects symbolically less 
exclusive than the social and citizenship relations they displace. To oppose 
what is so destructive and divisive in neoliberal capitalism requires an 
openness that we might borrow from it too.  
 
This point might be expressed in more specific and immediate terms. If we 
remain in thrall to the model of the ‘golden age’ and continue as I have 
suggested to be caught up with a refusal to address the racially exclusionary 
character of welfare citizenship, then we begin to consolidate a political 
imaginary that potentially lines up the exponents and champions of the 
welfare state against the predilections and orientations of some minoritized 
citizens who may find meaning in a different set of reference points. When 
racialized minorities are posited as having most to lose from the dismantling 
of the welfare state, it is easy, but wrong, to suggest that they must be grateful 
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to others in their actions to protect it, or that their own ambivalence towards it 
or rational pursuit of alternative scenarios should be held against them (and in 
doing so rerunning a theoretically anachronistic economic reductionism that 
can only understand race and racism as epiphenomena of class struggle). By 
reinforcing a racialized model of welfare citizenship, we also reduce the 
constituency of those who might be rallied to ‘protect’, ‘defend’, rework and 
reimagine the welfare state. 
